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1 
Revisiting the apology as a speech act: The case of 
parliamentary apologies 
Abstract 
By looking at both apologies made in everyday conversation and those made 
by politicians in public, I aim in this paper to provide a full set of felicity 
conditions for the speech act of apology.  I also discuss how refinements to 
previously proposed categories of apology strategies are needed to 
accurately describe how (British) politicians apologise.  I endeavour to show 
that with these refinements, the speech act approach to apologies is 
applicable to those of a political nature, as well as those in everyday 
conversation.  Using these developments I analyse how Members of the U.K. 
Parliament apologise for a variety of offences.  This analysis shows that MPs 
make more fulsome apologies than the apologies found in everyday 
conversation.  The type of offence has an effect on how an MP apologises, 
with apologies for financial irregularities being the more detailed and making 
use of more conventional strategies than other apologies.   
1 Introduction 
Studies into apologies in everyday conversation have, by and large, been 
couched in speech act theory (for instance Cohen and Olshtain, 1981; 
Trosborg, 1987; Suszcyńska, 1999).  Apologies made by politicians have 
come under increasing scrutiny in the last decade, with studies exploring them 
from a social-psychological standpoint (e.g. Blatz et al., 2009), a sociological 
perspective (e.g. Tavuchis, 1991), as well as taking pragmalinguistic 
approaches (e.g. Harris et al., 2006).  In this paper, I aim to show that the 
speech act approaches found in research on apologies in everyday 
conversation can equally be applied to political apologies.  I do this through 
the detailed analysis of 56 apologies made on the floor of the House of 
Commons.  Before getting to this analysis, I explore the felicity conditions of 
the speech act of apology (section 2).  In section 3, I go on to discuss how the 
apology strategies found in the Cross Cultural Speech Act Realisation 
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2 
Patterns (CCSARP) project (Blum-Kulka and Olshtain, 1984) require some 
changes to fully describe apologies in political discourse.  A discussion of the 
sometimes complex participation structure (Goffman, 1981: chapter 3; 
Levinson, 1988) found in the House of Commons follows in section 4.  Section 
5 provides and discusses the results – showing what strategies Members of 
Parliament (MPs) prefer when apologising on the floor of the House of 
Commons, highlighting how the type of offence can affect the form of the 
apology, and describing how apologies made by politicians differ from those 
found in everyday conversation.  Suggestions for further work and 
conclusions are offered in section 6.   
2 Felicity conditions 
The CCSARP project did not propose a set of felicity conditions for apologies, 
instead it focussed on the various strategies used by speakers to perform 
their apologies and as Trosborg (1994:375) notes ‘[t]he act of apologizing is 
not among the types of illocutionary acts for which the rules of use have been 
explicitly formulated by Searle’.  There have been, to my knowledge, just two 
proposals for a full set of felicity conditions for the apology, the first by Owen 
(1983) and more recently by Ogiermann (2009).  They are similar in a number 
of respects and are both potentially problematic.  In this section I will focus on 
the disadvantages of those suggested by Ogiermann (2009) though all of the 
criticisms except the one in §2.1.2 could equally be levelled at Owen’s 
(1983:117-124) proposals since they share a number of similarities.  I will also 
offer an alternative set of rules. 
2.1 Propositional content 
2.1.1 Speaker responsibility 
Searle and Vanderveken (1985:16) argue that in an illocution of type F(P), the 
illocutionary force F ‘will impose certain conditions in the propositional content 
P’.  One of the implications of this, they suggest, is that ‘if a speaker 
apologizes for something it must be for something that he [sic] has done or is 
otherwise responsible for’ (ibid.)  By way of example, they propose that a 
‘speaker cannot successfully apologize for the law of modus ponens or the 
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3 
elliptical orbit of the planets’ (ibid.).  Possibly in light of this statement, 
Ogiermann (2009:46) suggests that the propositional content of an apology is 
a ‘past act A done by S[peaker]’.  I think that is an inaccurate proposal, even 
(and, perhaps, especially) in light of Searle and Vanderveken’s definitions of 
illocutionary force. 
 
This first difficulty with wording the propositional content in this way can be 
highlighted with an example taken from Holmes (1989:196, her example (2)): 
 
(1) Context: A’s child spills her drink on V’s carpet. 
A: Oh look I’m terribly sorry.  I’ll clean it up.  Have you got a cloth? 
V: Don’t worry.  I’ll do it.  It wasn’t very much. 
 
According to Ogiermann’s propositional content, we would have to contend 
that this was an infelicitous apology since the speaker (A in this case) was not 
the person who performed the offensive act.  However, V treats A’s utterance 
as an apology with the response ‘Don’t worry’ which according to Robinson 
(2004) should be considered a preferred response to an apology called 
‘absolution’.  Furthermore, it may be the case that A’s child is unaware of the 
offensiveness of the action and that the child also does not have the 
necessary linguistic resources available to him/her to apologise.  In these 
instances, I think we are able to argue that it is possible for someone to 
apologise on other’s behalf.  Indeed, Searle and Vanderveken leave this 
possibility open by saying that an action which a speaker ‘is otherwise 
responsible for’ is a legitimate source of an apology. 
 
Whilst it is fairly uncontroversial to suggest that apologies such as the one in 
example (1) are felicitous, there has been no real discussion in linguistic 
approaches to the apology regarding how widely the idea of responsibility for 
an offence should be interpreted.  In their work on political apologies, Harris et 
al. (2006) discuss a number of examples of apologies made by British 
politicians.  One apology highlighted was made by Geoff Hoon, the then 
Defence Secretary, following the death of a soldier (Sgt. Roberts) in Iraq 
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which was, in part, caused by the lack of protective equipment.  In that 
apology, Hoon said: 
 
(2) Hoon: Some 38,000 sets of that enhanced body armour was sent to 
theatre. We wanted him to have that equipment.  I’m extremely sorry 
that he did not have it. (quoted in Harris et al., 2006:727) 
 
Harris et al. (2006:727f) go on to discuss the controversy that surrounded the 
apology which was caused, amongst other things, by Hoon refusing to accept 
direct responsibility for the death.  I highlight the example in (2) to show how 
responsibility for an action is not the same as having performed it.  To satisfy 
the conditions set out by Ogiermann (2009:46), Hoon would, presumably, 
have to have been the person who fired the shot which was fatal to Sgt. 
Roberts.  Though Hoon himself attempted to side-step the responsibility for 
the tragic outcome (by suggesting that he ‘made enough body armour 
available, but it was not, by implication, properly distributed by those on the 
ground (the military)’ (Harris et al., 2006:727)), we can argue that he is still 
(indirectly) responsible for Sgt. Roberts’ death.  As the minister in charge of 
the safe deployment of troops to Iraq, it was Hoon’s duty to ensure that troops 
were receiving the equipment which his ministry was providing.  So despite 
not having performed the action himself, and despite not accepting the direct 
responsibility either, I think it is still fair to argue that Hoon could apologise 
felicitously (if he so wished) for the death of Sgt. Roberts.  Indeed, if his 
apology had been worded in a way which pleased Sgt. Roberts’ wife, she 
would apparently have welcomed it as a satisfactory apology (Harris et al., 
2006:727-8).  This leads us to a wider interpretation of Searle and 
Vanderveken’s ‘otherwise responsible for’ criteria than I believe they intended.  
I think a speaker need only be indirectly responsible for action to be able to 
felicitously apologise for it.    
 
Taking this further, I think there is scope to extend the notion of ‘otherwise 
responsible’ beyond an apologiser being indirectly responsible.  The recent 
trend of politicians apologising for acts of historical wrongdoing has been 
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widely noted and is fast becoming a cottage industry in linguistic and social 
psychological research (see Lind, 2008; Kampf 2009; Augustinos et al., 2011 
for some recent examples of such work).  Using Ogiermann’s felicity 
conditions, and even Searle and Vanderveken’s less strict suggestion of what 
constitutes the propositional content of apologies, we would have to conclude 
that modern politicians’ apologies for their nations’ involvement in the Slave 
Trade, support of military juntas, colonisation and denial of equal rights for 
women (amongst other things) do not represent well-meant apologies.  Many, 
especially journalists, would agree that such statements cannot be classed as 
apologies.  Let us look at Gordon Brown’s apology to the Home Children1 by 
way of example.   
 
(3) To all those former child migrants and their families, to those here with 
us today and those across the world-to each and every one-I say today 
that we are truly sorry. They were let down. We are sorry that they 
were allowed to be sent away at the time they were most vulnerable. 
(Gordon Brown, 24/02/2010; vol. 506, col. 301)2 
 
There was much debate before and after Brown made the statement.  The 
view taken by most journalists is best summarised by Rod Liddle’s opinion 
piece in The Spectator magazine: 
I never knew it was Gordon Brown who sent all those 
kids off to Australia, packed them off and waved 
goodbye from the quayside, and now feels terribly 
bad about the whole thing 
(http://www.spectator.co.uk/spectator/thisweek/55497
                                                 
1 The Home Children were victims of the British Government’s policy between 1869 and 1967 
to send children from care homes to live and work in other Commonwealth countries.  They 
faced abuse, neglect and poor living conditions in those countries.   
2 Vol. 506, col. 301 is a reference to where this example can be found in Hansard (the ‘Official 
Report’ of parliamentary business and available online at 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/hansard/). 
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53/say-youre-sorry-but-never-apologise-for-anything-
youve-actually-done.thtml,  18/11/2009) 
Liddle implies that since Gordon Brown was not actually involved, neither 
directly nor indirectly, in the policy (he was only 15 years old when the forced 
migrations ended), he cannot apologise for it.  But the response of journalists 
to the apology does not, necessarily, give us the best indication of what 
counts as a ‘real’ apology.  In this instance, I think we should look to victims 
and their representatives to see how Brown’s statement was interpreted.  
Harold Haig of The International Association of Former Child Migrants and 
their Families said that Brown’s statement was: 
a moment in history when there can be reconciliation 
between the government, the nation and child 
migrants (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8531664.stm, 
24/02/2010) 
We can argue that apologies have a perlocutionary goal of restoring good 
relations between the speaker and the injured party which we could otherwise 
describe as reconciliation (Turnbull, 2003:106).  Since Harold Haig suggested 
that Brown’s statement fulfilled the perlocutionary goal of an ‘apology’ (that of 
eliciting forgiveness and reconciliation), I think we should view the statement 
as a felicitous apology3.  
2.1.2 Timing of the offence 
Aside from implications for speaker responsibility for offences, Ogiermann’s 
suggested propositional content also restricts the timing of a felicitous 
apology4.  By stipulating that only ‘past acts’ can be apologised for felicitously, 
the implication is that speech events which pre-empt an offence taking place 
                                                 
3 Apologies for historical wrongdoing do not form part of the corpus of apologies analysed for 
this article but I mention them here so that my suggested felicity conditions are as thorough 
as possible. 
4 Ogiermann and Owen’s felicity conditions diverge when it comes to offence timing.  Owen’s 
propositional content allows an offence to be a ‘past act, or an act that S is engaged in at the 
time of speaking, or a future act whose occurrence is assured’ (Owen, 1983:117). 
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7 
cannot be viewed as well-meant apologies.  Such a restriction seems sensible 
when we consider an utterance like the one in (4): 
 
(4) *I apologize for not having left by tomorrow (Fraser, 1981:261) 
 
Such an utterance cannot be interpreted as an apology and would strike most 
native speakers as odd, to say the least.  Fraser suggests that (4) does not 
constitute an apology ‘since there is, at the time of speaking, no relevant act 
over which to apologize’ (ibid.).  I am not convinced by this explanation.  I 
think the unacceptability of (4) lies in ‘having + past participle’ (normally used 
to indicate a completed, i.e. past, event) being used in combination with future 
event and not with the verb ‘to apologise’ being used with a future event.  
Changing this example so that it still conveys the same message (i.e. an 
apology for not leaving until after tomorrow) gives us a seemingly acceptable 
apology: 
 
(4')  I apologise for not being able to leave by tomorrow 
 
A further example from a debate in the House of Commons on school 
teachers’ pay and conditions may emphasise my point that future actions can 
be the subject of apologies: 
 
(5) I apologise in advance to the House because I shall not be able to 
remain for the whole of the debate owing to a long standing and 
important commitment in another part of the Palace of Westminster. 
(Bob Dunn, 27/11/1990; vol. 181, col. 771) 
 
In (5) Mr. Dunn apologises because he will leave the debate early, which 
breaches the parliamentary convention that, when speaking in a debate, one 
should stay in the chamber to see the conclusion of that debate.   Despite 
being for an act that is yet to occur, Mr. Dunn’s utterance is seemingly 
accepted as an apology by the other participants in the debate (there is no 
uptake of the apology as we would find in everyday conversation, but nobody 
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8 
passes comment from a sedentary position about the acceptability or 
otherwise of his statement).  Moreover, we often find utterances similar to that 
in (5) in everyday talk – we apologise in advance when we are unable to 
attend meetings; public bodies apologise in advance of closing important 
services; we apologise before saying something potentially impertinent.  
Coulmas (1981) also discusses instances of ex ante apologies, as he calls 
them, for matters such as intruding on someone.  Such apologies have led to 
‘the derived usage of apology expressions as attention getters’ (ibid.:76).  I 
think all of these apologies can be viewed felicitously (provided they fulfil the 
other felicity conditions). 
 
2.1.3 Reformulating the propositional content 
Bearing the previous discussions in mind, I propose that the propositional 
content for a felicitous apology should be thought of as: 
 
An act done, or to be done in the future, by the speaker or someone for 
whom the speaker is a formally recognised representative. 
2.2 Preparatory condition 
Ogiermann’s (2009:46) suggestion for the preparatory condition, ‘S[peaker] 
believes that [past act] A is an offence against H[earer]’, may also be 
troublesome, if interpreted strictly.  Consider the following example with which 
many couples will identify: 
 
(6) Context: James has just left the bathroom; his partner Emily enters to 
use the toilet 
Emily: For Christ’s sake, can you stop leaving the toilet seat up?! 
James: I’m sorry – I keep forgetting. 
 
This seemingly frivolous example highlights the problem with wording the 
preparatory condition in this way.  I do not find the act of leaving the toilet seat 
up to be an offence, indeed if Emily were to leave the toilet in this way I would 
be pleased rather than perturbed.  In this case, then, is my apology 
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9 
infelicitous?  Given that I was the speaker in (6), I would contend that it was 
well-meant and heartfelt.  Despite not personally finding the action offensive, I 
know from my world knowledge and from her utterance that my interlocutor 
does find my action offensive.   
 
I was party to another instance of apology which gave me reason to 
reconsider the formulation of the preparatory condition.  My brother and I were 
visiting my parents and engaging in some friendly banter when the following 
took place: 
 
(7) James: [laughing] You are a total dick sometimes 
Mother: Oi! There’s no need for that.  Say sorry. 
Craig: Mam, it was only a joke 
James: Sorry mate 
 
The utterance I produced was not in response to any action which I thought 
that Craig had found offensive (indeed, his assertion that it was a joke 
suggests he did not interpret it as an offence), but instead to my mother’s 
suggestion that my utterance was an offence.  In producing my apology, my 
aim was to show my mother that I was willing to make good my relations with 
my brother (even if I did not think they had been damaged) and to some 
extent, repair any damage to my relationship between my mother and me.  
Blum-Kulka and Olshtain conceive of this sort of offence when they note that 
offences can be ‘perceived by S only, by H only, by both S and H, or by a third 
party as a breach of a social norm’ (1984:206, emphasis mine). 
 
Both of these matters need to be taken into account so I think re-wording the 
preparatory condition so that it reads something like: 
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S believes that the apology recipient (R), or a contextually relevant 
third party, believes that the act was an offence against R (or someone 
who R represents)5 
 
gives a more appropriate, albeit slightly more convoluted, proposal.   
2.3 Sincerity condition 
I think it is certainly true that a speaker must feel some regret to be able to 
apologise felicitously, otherwise she 6  could be said to be simply ‘going 
through the motions’ in her performance of the apology (see Wachtel, 1980 
for a discussion of this).  However, regret does not simply stem from the 
performance of the action, as Ogiermann’s (2009:46) wording of the sincerity 
condition (‘S regrets A’) would imply.  Indeed, if we return to example (6), I 
would not regret leaving the toilet seat up if Emily had made no overt 
complaint about this state of affairs.  As such, I believe that my regret stems 
not from having performed the action, but instead from the potential damage 
to an otherwise convivial relationship that may have been caused by the 
action. As a result, it may be better to say that in a sincere apology, the 
speaker can regret either the act itself or one of its consequences.   
2.4 Summary 
To re-iterate then I would argue that the following felicity conditions are able to 
capture the vast majority of utterances which we would describe as apology 
speech-acts (both in everyday talk and political discourse): 
 
                                                 
5 I include the idea that the offence can have happened to a party who is not the recipient, but 
rather someone who the recipient represents, because of the existence of the historical 
apologies discussed in section 2.1.1.  A number of the victims of forced migration, for 
instance, had died before Gordon Brown’s apology but had surviving family members present 
to hear it.   
6 Where the gender of a speaker/hearer is not clear from the context of an example, I use 
feminine pronouns (she/her/etc.) to refer to any Speaker (or a non-specific MP), and 
masculine pronouns (he/him/etc.) to refer to a generic Hearer. 
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Propositional content: An act done, or to be done in the future, by the 
speaker or someone for whom the speaker is a formally recognised 
representative.  
 
Preparatory condition: Speaker believes that the apology recipient, or a 
contextually relevant third party, believes that the act was an offence 
against the recipient (or someone who the recipient represents). 
 
Sincerity condition: Speaker regrets the act or one of its consequences. 
 
Essential condition: Utterance counts as an apology. 
3 Apology strategies 
As discussed previously, the CCSARP project provides the most widely used 
categorisation of apology formulae, with studies including Trosborg (1987), 
Holmes (1989, 1990) and Suszcyńska (1999) relying on a more or less 
adapted version of their categories.  Blum-Kulka and Olshtain (1984:206) find 
that 'the act of apologizing can take one of two basic forms, or a combination 
of both'. Firstly a speaker may use an explicit 'illocutionary force indicating 
device’ (IFID), or alternatively she may make reference to one of the factors 
which precipitated the need for an apology and her responsibility for the 
offence. I think that these suggestions are fair ones, however what the 
CCSARP coding scheme categorises as IFIDs is, in my opinion at least, 
contestable.  The speech-act of apology can be carried with the following 
performative verbs which Blum-Kulka and Olshtain (1984:207) classify as 
'IFIDs': (be) sorry; excuse; apologize; forgive; regret; pardon. Whilst it is true 
to say that all of these verbs can be used to produce utterances functioning as 
apologies, it seems wrong-headed to argue that they can all explicitly indicate 
the illocutionary force of apologising. I believe that property is restricted to the 
verb 'to apologise' used performatively (this is noted by Owen (1983:116) but 
not discussed further).  Indeed, individual politicians and their 
advisors acknowledge that there is a (fundamental) difference between 
'apologise' and the other verbs labelled IFIDs in the CCSARP endeavour.  
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Consider the following thought found in Condoleezza Rice's memoir about her 
preparations before giving evidence at the 9/11 Truth Commission: 
 
(8) A part of me wanted to apologize, but the collective view of my 
advisors was that to do so would overwhelm anything else that I said.  
So instead I expressed regret. (Rice, 2011: xvii)                         
 
Here we can see that Rice's advisors did not want her to apologise but they 
found a speech act of indicating regret to be acceptable. There are 
further instances of Blum-Kulka and Olshtain's ‘IFIDs’ not acting as IFIDs (at 
least not for the speech act of apology).  Consider (9) which Deutschmann 
(2003:96) discusses and which comes from the spoken component of the 
British National Corpus: 
 
(9) Michael: <--|--> 7  Well that <--|--> that is an entirely hypothetical 
question 
        Nicky Campbell: <--|--> But in purely practical terms <--|--> 
Michael: <--|--> <unclear> <--|-->but I I'm sorry b--if you would let me 
answer. 
 
Michael is being interviewed by Nicky Campbell who has interrupted him 
numerous times prior to this extract.  With that taken into consideration we 
would not argue that Michael's ‘I'm sorry’ in (9) is an apology, but rather I 
would suggest that it constitutes a ‘challenge’8 or reprimand to the interrupter. 
Whilst these non-apologetic functions can be found for the other verbs listed 
as IFIDs, the same cannot be said for 'to apologise' which when used 
performatively and non-ironically does, indeed, indicate the illocutionary force 
of apology and I would venture cannot carry the force of another speech act. 
 
                                                 
7 Indicates overlapping speech in the BNC transcription conventions. 
8 Deutschmann (2003:96) himself describes this as a ‘challenging apology’ as he uses the 
term apology as a descriptor of form, rather than function. 
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Because of the inherent differences between ‘to apologise’ and the other 
verbs which can, but do not always, indicate an apology, I suggest that ‘to 
apologise’ stands alone as the IFID for English apologies with the other verbs 
conventionally implicating apology (see Table 1 for more details of the 
categorisation which I propose). 
 
The problems with the CCSARP taxonomy go beyond the easily resolved mis-
categorisation of some verbs as IFIDs.  A further issue arises when we 
attempt to analyse an utterance of the sort found in example (10): 
 
(10) Nicholas Edwards (01/03/1982; vol. 19, col. 21)9 […] i would like to 
apologise to the right honourable gentleman for the rhondda for 
suggesting that he might have been drinking […] 
 
Whilst the CCSARP codes for indirectness when looking at requests, no 
similar categories are proposed for apologies which are performed as indirect 
speech acts (see Searle, 1975 for a more detailed discussion).  As a result, 
we are to assume that Blum-Kulka and Olshtain would categorise the apology 
performed in (10) as an IFID, in the same way as a direct utterance like ‘I 
apologise’.  I do not think this is satisfactory.  
 
In example 10, the apology is performed indirectly through a speech act like 
‘statement of intent/desire’.  We can say that the utterance gives rise to an 
implicature of the sort ‘with this utterance, I am performing an apology’.  
However, as with all implicatures, that inferred meaning is cancellable – 
Edwards could easily have added ‘but I’ve been advised against it’ as we saw 
with Condoleezza Rice previously, or something more confrontational like ‘but 
                                                 
9  Examples like the one in (10) have been transcribed using the conventions found in 
Jefferson (2004) from recordings provided by the Parliamentary Recordings Unit.  Examples 
which are transcribed come from apologies analysed for the purposes of this paper, the 
results of which can be found in section 5.  The main conventions are:  capitalisation used 
only for speech which is noticeably louder, (.) = micropause, (0.3) = pause timed in seconds, 
°xxx° = noticeably quieter speech, x: = lengthened sound, xxx = emphasised word/syllable. 
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it was the case that he was drunk’.  Neither of these utterances would 
contradict what had been said before and both would block the potential 
implicature that Edwards is apologising.  This block would lead the hearer to 
access the literal meaning that Edwards would only like to apologise10.  That 
an apology can be performed with what Blum-Kulka and Olshtain (1984) 
would call an IFID, but also indirectly through another speech act needs to be 
acknowledged if we are to have an accurate description of how apologies are 
performed.   
 
The categories for apology strategies that I propose are not radically different 
from those found in Blum-Kulka and Olshtain (1984) but include some 
refinements; the need for which I have outlined.  In some respects, the 
strategies I suggest are more similar to the distinctions drawn by Fraser 
(1981) which have sadly been dismissed in some quarters as ‘rather pedantic’ 
(Schwartz, 1999:24).  I think not drawing the distinction between statements 
of intent (‘I’d like to apologise’) and direct statements of apology (‘I apologise’)  
- as Fraser does - could lead us to missing nuances in the speaker’s intention.  
Whilst in everyday conversation it may be that these slight differences have 
little bearing on the direction of the conversation, in political discourse 
meanings which have to be inferred may not always be accessed successfully 
by the hearer.  Indeed, as Gastil (1992:481) notes, ‘some listeners will infer 
the intended meaning; others will take other meanings, and some may miss 
the implicature altogether, thinking the surface structure meaning is sufficient’.  
It may also be that those implicatures are not accessed deliberately in order to 
either obfuscate or embarrass an interlocutor.  Consider the following 
example from a session of question time in the New Zealand parliament: 
 
(11) Hon Chris Carter: I would like to ask the Minister why she wrote in the 
October edition of the New Zealand Educational Institute’s magazine, 
Rourou— 
                                                 
10  Of course, Edwards did not say anything which blocked the inference that he was 
apologising and so his statement was accepted as an apology by The Speaker of the House 
of Commons, and the person to whom he was apologising.   
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Hon Rodney Hide: I raise a point of order, Mr Speaker. […] But, 
once again, the previous Minister failed to ask a question. To say “I 
would like” to do something is not asking a question. 
Mr SPEAKER: Technically, the honourable member is correct. 
(NZ Parliament, vol. 651, col. 707 – available from 
http://www.parliament.nz/)  
 
In (11) Carter’s statement would, in normal circumstances, be treated as a 
question and as such responded to by the minister.  However, Hide refuses to 
accept the intended meaning which could be drawn from Carter’s utterance in 
order to either delay the minister’s having to provide an answer, or to make 
Carter seem foolish in that he cannot even ask a question properly11.  To not 
draw attention to these indirect strategies for apologising would, therefore, 
give an incomplete picture of how politicians tend to apologise.   
 
The table below shows the apology strategies which I believe to be most 
salient, I highlight each of them with an example taken from the corpus of 
parliamentary apologies analysed as part of this study.   
 
Broad category Sub-category (individual 
strategy) 
Example (taken from 
apologies analysed in this 
paper) 
A Explicit 
expression of 
apology 
i. A performative IFID James Gray (16/03/2000; 
vol. 346, col. 520): […] i 
therefore apologise to you 
and to the house […] 
ii. A commissive with 
‘apology’/‘apologies’ as 
a direct object 
Nicholas Scott (10/05/1994; 
vol. 243, col. 155): […] i offer 
my unreserved apologies to 
the house. 
                                                 
11 Hansen (2008:1397f) gives further reasons for why otherwise inferable meanings may be  
rejected in favour of literal meanings.  
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B Conventional 
(indirect) apology 
formula 
i. An expression of 
regret 
Michael Trend (13/02/2003; 
vol. 399, col. 1073): °[…] i 
am sir so very sorry°.  
ii. A request for 
acceptance of 
apology/forgiveness 
Tony Baldry (21/07/2005; 
vol. 436, col. 1430): […] and 
i HOPE the house will 
accept this heartfelt and 
unconditional apology […] 
iii. A statement of desire Kali Mountford (27/07/1999; 
vol. 336, col. 149): […] i 
would like to apologise to 
you (0.3) and to the house. 
iv. A statement of 
obligation 
Peter Hain (18/07/1994; vol. 
247, col. 35): […] madam 
speaker i must offer you and 
the house a full and 
complete apology in two 
respects […] 
C Non-conventional 
indirect apology 
strategy 
i. Explanation, account, 
or excuse 
Tim Devlin (19/01/1989; vol. 
145, col. 494): […] i now 
know that the allegation that 
i made in the house 
yesterday was based on uh 
(.) untrue information […] 
ii.  Accepting the blame Don Touhig (27/07/1999; 
vol. 336, col. 149): […] it is 
the duty for each of us to 
take responsibility for our 
actions and i do not shirk 
from that duty today. […] 
iii. Expressing self-
deficiency 
Tony Baldry (21/07/2005; 
vol. 436, col. 1430): […] my 
letter to the secretary of 
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state was clearly very poorly 
written […] 
iv. Recognising H as 
entitled to an apology 
Ben Bradshaw (20/05/2003; 
vol. 805, col. 461): mister 
speaker the honourable 
gentlemen are both er 
entirely right […] 
v. Expressing lack of 
intent 
Stephen Byers (17/10/2005; 
vol. 437, col. 639): […] I did 
not deliberately intend to 
mislead the select 
committee […] 
vi. An offer/statement of 
repair/redress 
Michael Forsyth 
(05/02/1997; vol. 289; col. 
1067): […] and i:: withdraw 
what i said […] 
vii. A statement of non-
recurrence 
Theresa May (30/06/2010; 
vol. 512, col. 863): […] i will 
ensure that it will not happen 
again. 
Table 1: Categories of methods for apologising 
We can see that there is a hierarchy of explicitness between the broad 
categories, with category A containing the utterances which can only be 
interpreted as apologies; utterances in category B can be thought of as 
Generalised Conversational Implicatures in that they require specific contexts 
for their processing as apologies to be blocked; strategies which fall into 
category C are best described as Particularised Conversational Implicatures 
since the idea that the speaker is carrying out an apology is only derivable by 
the context and is not contained in the utterance itself12.  Whilst there is this 
hierarchy in the broad categories, I would not assert that within categories 
                                                 
12 Levinson (1995) explains the distinction between GCI and PCI in far more detail than I can 
provide here. 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
18 
there is an order of explicitness – that is to say that there does not seem to be 
any basis for claiming that Bi (An expression of regret) is more of a GCI than 
Biv (A statement of obligation). 
4 Participation structure in the House of Commons 
In this section I explore the complex ‘participation structure’ (Levinson, 1988) 
in Parliament.  Put simply, participation structure seeks to describe the 
various rôles carried out by parties in a speech event.  Whilst it is certainly 
important to get away from ‘the primitive notions of speaker and hearer’ 
(Goffman, 1981:129) in our descriptions of everyday conversation, it is all the 
more necessary to do this in analyses of parliamentary discourse since the 
number of participants is frequently large and talk is influenced by rules and 
traditions. 
      
Firstly, it needs to be noted that all of the apologies looked at in this study are 
for offences that an MP has herself carried out or is in some way responsible 
for.  In this respect the participation structure is less complex than apologies 
made by MPs for historical acts.  That being said, apologies made in 
parliament have the added complication that they cannot be directed at 
anyone other than the Speaker of the House of Commons.  Thus, as Ilie 
(2010:897) notes, when an MP uses the pronoun you, she is  referring, in the 
vast majority of cases, to The Speaker13.  Other members can only be 
referred to in the third person and by using formulaic expressions like ‘My 
Honourable Friend’, ‘The Honourable Member’, etc. and not by using their 
name. 
 
The majority of apologies previously researched have been of a simple, 
dyadic type.  These tend to have a participation framework seen in Figure 1. 
 
[[[INSERT FIG1 HERE]]] 
                                                 
13 I use ‘The Speaker’ as shorthand for The Speaker of the House of Commons, this should 
not be confused with ‘speaker’ (or S) which is used generically for a person who is speaking. 
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In everyday conversation, it is virtually always the case that the speaker is not 
only the animator (i.e. the person uttering the words), but also the author (the 
person who planned what would be said) and the principal (the person whose 
feelings are being represented by the utterance).  In such an apology, the 
offended party is nearly always the addressee (the person at whom the 
speaker directs her gaze and to whom the address pronouns used by the 
speaker refer) as well as the recipient (the participant for whom the speaker’s 
words are intended). Depending on the situation, there may be other people in 
earshot of the speech event in which case there would also be ratified or 
unratified overhearers as participants in the conversation. 
 
The situation is very different when it comes to parliamentary apologies.  Let 
us consider one of the simplest examples analysed in this corpus.  In 1988, a 
letter written by Sir Anthony Meyer which criticised and insulted a fellow MP 
was leaked to the press.  Meyer sought to apologise to Donald Coleman, the 
offended party, by way of a personal statement made on the floor of the 
House of Commons.  Personal statements must be shown to The Speaker in 
advance and s/he approves their contents.  These statements must then be 
read word for word and are heard in silence and no comments or questions 
can follow them.  Figure 2 shows how we can consider the participant 
structure in Meyer’s apology. 
 
[[[INSERT FIG2 HERE]]] 
 
Firstly, we can see that the ‘speaker’ rôles are split, with the authorship of the 
apology being divided between Meyer, advisors who are often charged with 
drafting an MP’s speeches in the Commons, and The Speaker who often asks 
for changes to be made to a personal statement before s/he allows it to be 
made in the chamber (House of Commons Information Office, personal 
Figure 1: Participants in apologies in everyday conversation 
Figure 2: Participant structure in Sir Anthony Meyer’s apology 
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communication).  Naturally, Meyer acts as the principal and animator since he 
delivers the apology and is assumed to feel the regret for the offence.  The 
‘hearer’ rôles are also divided between different parties.  The Speaker is 
conventionally the addressee since all talk in the House of Commons is 
directed at the chair (indeed, Meyer begins his speech with: “Mr. Speaker I 
wish to make a personal statement”), however The Speaker is not the ultimate 
target of the apology proper.  The apology is intended for Donald Coleman 
who we can label the ‘recipient’ of Meyer’s utterances.  Other people either 
present in the chamber, or those listening on the radio14 can be thought of as 
ratified overhearers, since they are not intended by Meyer to be the target of 
his apology but are known to be listening to his words.  There are no 
unratified overhearers since the apology is made in this highly public setting. 
   
Apologies made in the Commons can be even more complex than the one 
show in Figure 2.  In 1987, Richard Hickmet criticised the then Speaker of the 
House, Bruce Weatherill, accusing him of being biased in interviews to the 
press.  He was forced to apologise to The Speaker by way of a personal 
statement in the House of Commons.  In delivering his utterance, the 
participation structure for Richard Hickmett’s apology statement can be 
thought of thus: 
[[[INSERT FIG3 HERE]]] 
Firstly, we find a non-human recipient in Hickmett’s apology in that he 
apologises to ‘the House’, which acts as a metonym for all those people 
working in and associated with the House of Commons.  The House can be 
found as a recipient in many of the apologies made in Parliament (43 of the 
56 in this study) and I would suggest that it is invoked as a recipient as a 
means of acknowledging any damage caused to the reputation and standing 
of the House of Commons as a result of the apologiser’s offence.  Also 
significant in Hickmett’s apology (and all those statements where The 
                                                 
14 Radio broadcasts of House of Commons business began in 1978, and video cameras were 
allowed into the House following a close vote amongst MPs in November 1989.   
Figure 3: Participant structure in Richard Hickmett's apology 
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Speaker is the offended party) is the number of roles The Speaker finds 
him/herself playing.  Not only is The Speaker the apologisee, but in some 
respects s/he is also the apologiser because of his/her function in the 
authorship of the apology.  This reflects the ritual nature of apologies made on 
the floor of the House of Commons – Hickmett will have already apologised to 
The Speaker in person before his statement, but he must go through the 
motions of performing the apology in parliament so that the House and the 
overhearing parties can pass judgement on his statement.     
 
Whilst Hickmett’s apology is interesting, the majority of apologies in the 
corpus are not targetted at The Speaker for offences against him/her, but 
instead are for actions which breach the rules of the House or which offend an 
MP or MPs.  Where these apologies are made as personal statements, as 
most are (40/56), the participation structure looks something like that in Figure 
4. 
 
[[[INSERT FIG4 HERE]]] 
 
 
 
Some apologies are made as points of order instead of personal statements.  
This means that they are made after regular business – such a debates or 
question sessions – by catching The Speaker’s attention.  These apologies 
usually come quite quickly after the offence has occurred (usually less than 24 
hours after it) and are often used to correct the record.  Apologies made in 
this way are not scrutinised by The Speaker, can be made spontaneously 
(though are often written and read aloud) and can be commented upon by 
members afterwards.  The participants in these apologies are similar to that 
shown in Figure 4, with the exception that The Speaker no longer contributes 
to the rôle of author, and if the apology is made very shortly after the offence, 
it may be the case that the MP’s advisors also do not feature in that rôle.   
 
Figure 4: Participant structure in 'Personal statement' apologies 
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The effects of having an addressee who is not necessarily the ‘victim’ at 
whom the apology is directed (the ‘apologisee’) can be seen in the low rates 
of usage of particular apology strategies, which will be discussed further in the 
following section (cf. §5.3 in particular).   
5 Results 
In this section I share the findings from the analysis of 56 apologies performed 
on the floor of the House of Commons.  My focus in this work was on 
instances of statements made in Parliament which had the principal aim of 
carrying out an apology. As a consequence, these 56 apologies are not the 
sum of all apologies ever made in the House and a large number of adhoc 
apologies which appear in other parliamentary contributions are not analysed.  
A parliamentary briefing note (House of Commons Information Office, 2012) 
provides a list of statements which had the purpose of apologising in the 
House of Commons since 1979.  Recordings of the statements listed in the 
document were then obtained from the Parliamentary Recordings Unit.  Six of 
the statements found in the list were not included in the analysis either 
because they are non-performative in nature (i.e. they only reported a 
previous apology, rather than actually carrying out an apology) or because the 
list inaccurately records them as oral statements when they were in fact 
letters sent to the Speaker. As noted previously, each apology was 
transcribed from these recordings to avoid reliance on the Hansard report 
since this ‘‘corrects’ the utterances of members of parliament’ (Chilton, 
2004:94) and thus may not give accurate information on MPs’ apologising 
strategies.  These transcripts were then coded for the strategies discussed in 
section 3. I first present global results for all MPs, comparing these to those 
found in everyday conversation and I then show what, if any, effect the nature 
of the offence has on the form of the apology. 
5.1 Overall results 
Table 2 shows the frequency with which MPs use each of the apology 
strategies discussed in section 3, as well how frequently the strategies are 
used in the average apology.
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Table 2: MPs use of each apology strategy 
 
Looking firstly at the totals, we find that MPs are often much more fulsome in 
their parliamentary apologies than they presumably would be in their lives 
outside of politics.  In her study of naturally occurring apologies, Holmes 
(1989:199) found that speakers used 295 apology strategies in 183 apologies 
– that is the mean apology contained roughly 1.6 apology strategies.  The 
mean apology on the floor of the House of Commons utilised more than twice 
that, with the average MP using 3.98 apology strategies in their apologies.  
 
Apology strategy Total 
Average/
apology 
Broad 
category 
average 
Ai Performative IFID 34 0.61 
0.84 Aii Commissive + ‘apology’ as 
direct object 
13 0.23 
Bi An expression of regret 20 0.36 
1.11 
Bii A request for forgiveness 3 0.05 
Biii A statement of desire 35 0.63 
Biv A statement of obligation 4 0.07 
Ci Explanation, account, or 
excuse 
21 0.38 
2.03 
Cii Acceptance of blame 22 0.39 
Ciii Expression of self-
deficiency 
17 0.30 
Civ Recognition of H’s 
entitlement to apology 
9 0.16 
Cv Expression of lack of intent 26 0.46 
Cvi An offer of repair 16 0.29 
Cvii A statement of non-
recurrence 
3 0.05 
Total 223 3.98 3.98 
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This suggests that MPs either feel it necessary, or simply wish to be fulsome 
in their apologies.  I would suggest that this fulsomeness derives from the lack 
of uptake for apologies made in Parliament.  Whilst in routine conversation 
speakers receive instant feedback on whether their apology has been 
accepted, parliamentary apologies are most often heard in silence and are 
infrequently responded to.  As a result a speaker must ensure she ‘covers all 
bases’ in her apology for it to receive the best possible reception.   
 
Also noticeable in the results is the relatively high rate of ‘explicit’ apologies 
involving the performative ‘to apologise’ or a nominal formulation derived from 
it.  This is in sharp contrast with everyday conversation where ‘apologise’ was 
found to be disfavoured in four major studies (Cohen and Olshtain, 1981; 
Owen, 1983; Holmes, 1990 and Meier, 1992).  We can attribute this low 
frequency in ‘normal’ talk to the ‘formal sounding’ (Fraser, 1981:268) nature of 
this sort of utterance.  Indeed, using an IFID for many speech acts in regular 
conversation can seem stilted and oddly distant (consider an utterance like: ‘I 
request that you open the window’ vs. ‘Would you open the window?’ for the 
speech act of requesting).  Whilst this distance is usually inappropriate, it is 
perfectly acceptable in the House of Commons where distance/deference is 
embedded in the interactional rules discussed in the previous section.  
 
Strategies which tend to be avoided (that is, we find fewer than ten instances 
of their use) are Bii (a request for forgiveness), Biv (a statement of obligation 
to apologise), Cvii (a statement of non-recurrence), and Civ (Recognition of 
H’s entitlement to an apology).  The latter will be discussed further in section 
5.3 on the influence of participation structure in apologies.  As for the first 
three, I would suggest that requests for forgiveness are disfavoured for two 
reasons.  The first is that such a request places a burden upon the hearer; 
instead of merely having to listen to an apology, he is having to make a 
decision on whether or not to forgive the speaker. Being burdened in this way 
is an additional face-threatening act.  Secondly, directly asking for forgiveness 
strikes me as being somewhat desperate, which I doubt is a characteristic the 
average MP would wish to convey.  An MP may avoid stating that she is 
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obliged to apologise because it could give the impression that she is only 
doing so out of obligation and under duress – rather than because she 
genuinely feels regret.  Finally, one could cynically suggest that MPs shun 
pledges of non-recurrence for fear that their future actions will be more 
intensely scrutinised by the press and public to ‘check up’ on such a pledge.  
Tellingly, Keith Vaz and Jonathan Sayeed’s apologies for financial 
misdemeanours which both employed strategies Bii and Biv have been 
described as ‘ill-judged’ and ‘blatantly counterfeit’ (Flynn, 2012:208).  Whilst 
other factors may have contributed to this impression, the use of these 
strategies are likely to have played a rôle. 
 
Aside from the results shown in Table 2, another noticeable difference in 
politicians’ apology behaviour is the presence of a detailed description of the 
offence which is being apologised for, which can be found in each of the 56 
apologies in the corpus (a description of the offence is different from strategy 
Ci – account, explanation or excuse – which gives reasons for why the offence 
happened, the description instead merely restates what the offence was).  
There are obvious contextual explanations for this – a description is (usually) 
absent in everyday conversation because the parties involved in the apology 
tend to know what the offence was, since, on the whole, an apology directly 
follows (or in some cases precedes) the committing of the offensive act.  
Apologies in the House of Commons, in contrast, not infrequently come some 
time after the offence (for instance, in this corpus Stephen Byers’ apology for 
providing inaccurate information came almost four years after the incident 
occurred).  In such situations there is a need for speakers to ‘refresh the 
memory’ of hearers about what triggered the need for the apology.  
Furthermore, the extra participants in a Commons apology also dictate the 
need for a description of the events leading up to it – for instance not all 
members present for Michael Portillo’s apology for failing to remind the House 
of his financial interests in a previous debate will have been present at the 
time this misdemeanour occurred and may not have been aware of it at all.  In 
this instance, they need ‘filling in’ about these events for them to be cogent 
recipients of the apology.  The same is also true for members of the public 
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who are ratified overhearers and who are even less likely to be aware of the 
events which led up to the parliamentary apology.  The presence of this 
description of the offence may also be explained by a more underhand 
motivation.  By choosing to describe their actions, MPs can do so on their own 
terms15, which gives them the opportunity to delimit the scale and severity of 
their offence.  Consider the following extract: 
 
(12) Malcolm Wicks (20/05/2003; vol. 405, col. 861): […] a press .hh 
release was prepared with the intention that it would be sent out after 
the written statement had been issued (.) i very much regret that the 
press release was mis- mistakenly issued last night […] 
 
Here the minister apologises for the offence which he defines as being the 
premature release of a press release. However, the actual action which led to 
his having to apologise was more serious than that what he describes.  In 
fact, it was not simply a summary of the statement which was given to the 
press before details were given to Parliament, but instead the whole 
statement was leaked to the press so that word-for-word quotes appeared in 
the morning papers before MPs had time to scrutinise the minister’s statement 
– a much graver discourtesy than Minister Wicks acknowledges.  Here one 
can see that descriptions of offences have the potential to downplay the 
severity of such actions – this aspect of parliamentary apologies deserves 
further investigation, which I will provide in future work.   
 
A further strategy found in some of the parliamentary apologies (12 instances 
in 10 of the 56 apologies) which is seemingly absent in routine conversation is 
the announcement of a previous apology or intention to apologise again 
(usually in person).  Examples 13 and 14 highlight this strategy: 
 
(13) Tony Baldry (23/03/2000; vol. 346, col. 1121): […] this was clearly an 
error of judgement on my part for which i have already apologised 
                                                 
15 Though they must bear in mind that The Speaker has to approve their statement, if they are 
apologising by way of a personal statement. 
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unreservedly in person to the committee for standards and privileges 
[…] 
(14) Peter Snape (07/02/1984; vol. 53 col. 772): […] i intend to 
communicate that view and also an apology to the general manager of 
british rail southern region today. 
 
I would venture that politicians adopt this strategy as it shows that they are not 
averse to apologising and that their doing so in person may indicate the 
seriousness of the regret that they feel for their offensive action(s).  This 
further exemplifies MPs’ desire to be as fulsome as possible in their 
apologies.  
5.2 Influence of offence type 
Holmes (1989:201) rightly suggests that ‘the type of offence which appears to 
require remedial work’ seems to be a major factor in influencing how we 
apologise.  The type of offences which require remedial work in the House of 
Commons clearly differ from those found in everyday conversation, although 
there is some overlap with ‘talk offences’ such as insulting or criticising 
someone occurring in both discourse domains.  Looking carefully at the 
offences which required an apology in the House of Commons we find the 
following groups of infractions (numbers in brackets indicate the frequency of 
such apologies in the corpus): 
 
i) Insulting/criticising another MP/MPs (16) 
ii) Misleading/providing incorrect information to the House (5) 
iii) Breaching a parliamentary convention (e.g. not telling another MP 
that he would be mentioned in one’s speech; leaking a report) (14) 
iv) Financial irregularities/non-declaration of financial interests (18) 
 
Three other apologies did not fit into any of these categories and did not form 
a homogenous grouping themselves (those apologies were for: hiring an 
assistant deemed a security risk; seeking out a sexual encounter in a public 
place; and damaging The Speaker’s chair).  These apologies were not 
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included in this analysis.  Table 3 shows the average frequencies of the 
various strategies for the apologies in each of the offence categories outlined 
above (raw figures are given in brackets). 
 
Taking the results for the total number of strategies used in each apology, we 
find a large discrepancy between apologies made for financial irregularities 
 Offence type 
Insulting an 
MP/MPs 
Misleading 
the House 
Breaching a 
convention 
Financial 
irregularities 
A
p
o
lo
g
y
 s
tr
a
te
g
y
 
Ai Performative IFID 0.25 (4) 0.00 (0) 0.57 (8) 1.17 (21) 
Aii Commissive + 
‘apology’ as direct object 
0.13 (2) 0.80 (4) 0.14 (2) 0.28 (5) 
Bi An expression of 
regret 
0.19 (3) 0.60 (3) 0.43 (6) 0.44 (8) 
Bii A request for 
forgiveness 
0.06 (1) 0.20 (1) 0.00 (0) 0.06 (1) 
Biii A statement of desire 0.81 (13) 0.20 (1) 0.71 (10) 0.50 (9) 
Biv A statement of 
obligation 
0.06 (1) 0.00 (0) 0.07 (1) 0.06 (1) 
Ci Explanation, account, 
or excuse 
0.44 (7) 1.00 (5) 0.36 (5) 0.17 (3) 
Cii Acceptance of blame 0.06 (1) 0.20 (1) 0.36 (5) 0.83 (15) 
Ciii Expression of self-
deficiency 
0.13 (2) 0.00 (0) 0.07 (1) 0.72 (13) 
Civ Recognition of H’s 
entitlement to apology 
0.31 (5) 0.20 (1) 0.14 (2) 0.06 (1) 
Cv Expression of lack of 
intent 
0.00 (0) 0.60 (3) 0.43 (6) 0.83 (15) 
Cvi An offer of repair 0.69 (11) 0.00 (0) 0.07 (1) 0.22 (4) 
Cvii A statement of non-
recurrence 
0.00 (0) 0.00 (0) 0.14 (2) 0.00 (0) 
 Total 3.13 (50) 3.80 (19) 3.50 (49) 5.33 (96) 
Table 3: The effect of offence type on apology strategy usage 
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and all of the other offence types.  MPs apologising for wrong claims on 
expenses or not declaring a financial interest use roughly two apology 
strategies more in their speeches in parliament than does an MP apologising 
for insulting or criticising a fellow member.  Olshtain’s (1989:163) finding that 
Hebrew speakers tend to ‘intensify the expression of apology’ by using more 
apology strategies when apologising for offences which they consider more 
serious seem also to be the case for British politicians and their apologies.  Of 
the offences for which apologies were given in the House of Commons, it is 
certainly the case that financial misdemeanours have the worst possible 
outcome for MPs (David Laws was forced to resign as a Cabinet minister for 
his expenses claims, a number of MPs were not given the opportunity to 
stand for re-election because of their financial irregularities and still more were 
the subject of highly critical media attention).  Because of the ‘high stakes’ 
involved when it comes to offences of this type, I think MPs feel it necessary 
to be viewed as being as apologetic as possible, in the hope that this regretful 
and contrite demeanour saves them from the worst punishments which can 
be meted out either by the parliamentary authorities or the press.  (Whether or 
not this strategy is successful is another matter entirely). 
 
This ‘high-stakes’ element could also help to explain the very high rates of 
explicit apology strategies (category A) for expenses abuses.  My suggestion 
for MPs using more explicit strategies for the most serious of the offences is 
that they want to be certain that their utterance is interpreted as an apology 
and using strategies from category A gives them a fair chance of achieving 
this.  On the face of it, this goes against Bergmann and Kasper’s (1993) 
finding that speakers produce more IFIDs for less serious offences, but it must 
be noted that I classify far fewer verbs as IFIDs than they do, which may 
explain this discrepancy.   
 
At the other end of the scale, apologies for insulting or criticising another MP 
are the least fulsome of those in the corpus (though still more fulsome than 
apologies in everyday conversation based on Holmes (1989) figures).  It is 
probable that these apologies are less detailed because MPs expect some 
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‘rough and tumble’ in the chamber, such that criticisms and insults are to 
some extent part and parcel of the parliamentary experience (see Murphy 
(forthcoming) for a discussion of aggressive linguistic behaviour in this arena).  
Indeed, the backbench MP, Paul Flynn, in his instructional book ‘How to be an 
MP’ actively encourages MPs to be critical and insulting of one another in a 
section entitled ‘How to cultivate enemies’ (Flynn, 2012:190).  Not only that, 
but the repercussions of insulting a member are fairly limited – whilst there 
may be some damage to the personal relationship between the MPs (if one 
existed), as long as the offender is seen to apologise then she will face no 
further punishment from The Speaker.    
 
Looking at some other strategies more briefly, we find that explanations and 
accounts (Ci) form a large part of apologies for misleading the House of 
Commons.  An MP would not wish to get a reputation for being untrustworthy 
in what she has to say and as a result needs to explain why any misleading or 
inaccurate information was provided to the House.  This need also explains 
why an expression of a lack of intent (Cv) is often used in these apologies – 
inadvertence in misleading the House should hopefully absolve the MP of the 
suggestion that she is unreliable.   
 
It is worth mentioning that an offer of repair (Cvi) mainly comes for the offence 
of insulting or criticising another MP.  The reason for this is that repair is easy 
to provide for such offences – one need only ‘withdraw’ the insult or criticism, 
which is relatively easy when compared with what one would have to do to 
repair the other offences (e.g. paying back large sums of money in the case of 
financial wrongdoing). 
 
The variation in MPs’ readiness to accept the blame (Cii) seems also to be 
linked to the offence type.  It is found only once in each of the categories of 
insulting an MP or misleading the House, but appears in nearly every apology 
for financial wrongdoing.  I would suggest that accepting blame is used rarely 
when one has misled the House because to do so would tacitly acknowledge 
that one is untrustworthy.  Another explanation of this relates to the media 
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coverage received by certain apologies.  A great deal of media attention is 
placed on MPs’ financial affairs and the aftermath of an MP being caught in 
wrongdoing, whereas less coverage is devoted to seemingly arcane matters 
of breaching parliamentary procedure, or issues which relate only to the 
‘Westminster bubble’ such as insults in the chamber.  In the case of the latter 
two offence types, an MP’s words are less likely to be heavily scrutinised by 
the press and so the particularly face-damaging act of explicitly accepting 
blame need not be carried out for her apology to be viewed as acceptable.  
The MP apologising for expenses troubles is likely to encounter more scrutiny 
(frequently these apologies are broadcast on local news programmes, and in 
the case of high profile MPs, e.g. Cabinet Ministers David Laws or Jacqui 
Smith, are covered in the national media).  In this case, the MP does not want 
to appear to be ‘passing the buck’ in any way and thus a strategy of accepting 
the blame seems a sensible way of appearing contrite and fully apologetic.   
 
To conclude this discussion of the effect of the offence type on apology 
strategies, I would suggest that it is not necessarily the seriousness of the 
transgression which influences the apology strategies selected by the 
apologiser as Bergmann and Kasper (1993) argued.  Whilst this may explain 
the high frequency of explicit apology strategies, I think it is the nature of the 
offence which accounts for the presence or absence of other strategies.  For 
instance, apologisers cannot easily express a lack of intent when apologising 
for insulting someone (or at least not without sounding dishonest) and it is this 
fact that explains its absence, not that the offence is viewed more or less 
seriously.  Moreover, offering repair when one has misled the House is not 
really feasible – providing the correct information during the apology does not 
expunge the misleading information from the record and there is nothing 
tangible that an MP can offer to ‘undo’ the damage.  A consideration of the 
context of a transgression needs, therefore, to be primary in our analyses. 
5.3 The rôle of participation structure  
Participation structure influences the form of parliamentary apologies in a 
number of ways.  The first is that the addressee (The Speaker) is always 
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acknowledged at the start of the apology statement.  This acknowledgement 
usually takes the form of asking permission from The Speaker to make a 
personal statement, or thanking him/her for calling the apologiser to 
contribute.   
 
An MP's constituents, who are always potential ratified overhearers to the 
apology, can be invoked directly in the apology, which upgrades their status to 
recipients.  This can be found in the apologies for financial misdemeanours (7 
of the 18 apologies for this offence type), but is not found in the any of the 
other apologies.  In cases where constituents are mentioned, they are not just 
apology recipients, but are often the subject of flattery from the apologiser.  
This can be seen the following example: 
 
(15) Harry Cohen (29/01/2010; vol. 504 col. 1044): […] two further 
apologies, (0.3) firstly to my constituents, (0.3) the good people of 
leyton and wanstead do not deserve to have their faith in their 
parliamentary representative so severely shaken (.) they deserve the 
best untarnished representation also the best of my efforts for the last 
twenty seven years has been to take up their cases including of 
injustice to them in the last ten months of this intensive inquiry into me 
i’ve had to give a lot of time to my own case when i would have much 
preferred to have been dealing with theirs.  […] 
 
That constituents are not recipients of apologies for other offences is clearly 
partly to do with the nature of the offence.  Constituents are not the offended 
party when an MP has leaked a statement to the press, or insult another MP, 
for instance.  But the consequences of those actions can impinge upon the 
constituents in ways similar to those highlighted by Harry Cohen in (15).  As a 
result, it is plausible for an MP to apologise to her constituents if she faces 
suspension from the House for insulting another MP, because this will impact 
upon the quality of representation that she can provide.  That MPs do not 
invoke constituents in apologies for these other offences may be explained by 
what I have said previously about the mediated nature of some the apologies.  
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Given that the apologies for financial misdemeanours are more likely to be 
seen by an MP’s constituents, it makes sense for her to apologise to them 
directly. 
 
That the hearer rôle is split between the addressee and recipient has 
implications for the viability of one of the apology strategies in particular. 
Recognising that the hearer is entitled to an apology (Civ) is made more 
difficult because the hearers number more than simply the party who was 
offended.   Acknowledging that the hearer is entitled to an apology is, I would 
suggest, more difficult to achieve in Parliament where the role of hearer does 
not (automatically) correspond to the offended party (i.e. the person(s) who 
would be deserving of the apology).   Moreover, because MPs cannot refer to 
each other by name and instead are required to use the name of an MP’s 
constituency or their job title to identify the particular target for their utterance 
(see Ilie 2010: 893ff for more on this), this makes picking out an individual 
referent (in this case, the offended party) more difficult.  This is, perhaps, 
further motivation for avoiding this strategy.     
 
The complexity of the participation structure can be (and is) exploited by some 
apologisers.  The case of George Galloway apologising for calling Ben 
Bradshaw a liar is a good example of this.  In a debate in Westminster Hall 
(an additional debating chamber used to allow non-partisan adjournment 
debates), Galloway was described by Minister Ben Bradshaw as ‘not just an 
apologist, but a mouthpiece, for the Iraqi regime over many years’ (an insult 
for which Bradshaw later apologised).  In response to this accusation, Mr. 
Galloway called the Minister ‘a liar’ and refused to withdraw the insult.  In his 
apology, the MP said the following: 
 
(16) George Galloway (07/03/2002; vol. 381 col. 450): […] in the debate in 
westminster hall yesterday exchanges became frank (.) to the point of 
being unacceptable and i should like to apologise to the chairman my 
honourable friend the deputy speaker in westminster  hall (.) hh to you 
mister speaker and to the house for my part in that. […] i would like to 
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say i am sorry for stepping out of parliamentary order and for my failure 
to withdraw my remarks when asked to do so by the deputy speaker 
and now to so withdraw them 
 
Here, Galloway highlights a number of recipients for his apology: the Deputy 
Speaker who was in the chair and whose order to withdraw the insult was 
ignored; The Speaker who is ultimately responsible for the orderly conduct of 
the House, despite him not being present at the time of the offence; and the 
House which is a metonym for those who work in and for the House of 
Commons.  Notice, however, that Galloway does not apologise directly to the 
offended party, Ben Bradshaw.  This refusal to acknowledge the offended 
party suggests that Galloway is not sorry for the (potential) damage done to 
the ‘victim’ but instead is sorry simply for the breach of the parliamentary norm 
(and the possible negative effects this could have on his speaking rights in the 
House).   
 
This section has described but a few ways in which the complex participation 
framework in the House of Commons impacts upon the form of an MP’s 
apology.  The MP frequently has in mind not only who is present in the 
chamber when she is apologising, but also who may access her apology after 
it is delivered.  Further dissemination and scrutiny of an apology may lead to 
an MP ensuring that those who are potential overhearers are ‘promoted’ to 
recipients.  Also indicative of an MP’s attitude towards performing an apology 
(her reticence or otherwise to do so) is the absence of recipients who ought to 
be there, for instance the offended party. 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper I have sought to develop a set of felicity conditions which 
accurately captures a full range of apologies, both public and private.  I have 
also provided some refinements to the CCSARP project’s taxonomy of 
apology strategies which I believe are necessary to describe parliamentary 
apologies, but are also applicable more widely.  The nature of participation 
structure in the House of Commons has been explored, I believe, for the first 
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time.  The complexity of that participation structure has been shown to affect 
politicians’ apologies, by limiting the acceptability of the strategy of accepting 
the hearer’s entitlement to an apology.  The fulsomeness of MPs’ apologies 
has also been highlighted and the effect that offence type has on the detail of 
these statements has also been noted.  There still remains a great deal of 
work to be done on parliamentary apologies, not least the issue I mentioned 
regarding how an MP’s description of an offence gives her the opportunity to 
mitigate the seriousness of her transgression.  The extent of mitigation more 
generally in political apologies needs to be further explored, too, as does the 
employment of paralinguistic features (tone of voice, gaze, body language, 
etc.), which seems to have a significant part to play in whether an apology is 
seen as genuine. Thus, for instance, Flynn (2012:207) notes that ‘Derek 
Conway’s personal statement accepted full guilt for employing a relative.  But 
his confident smiling demeanour showed no evidence of remorse’.  What the 
paralinguistic components are in a ‘good’ apology merits detailed 
investigation.  The taxonomy I have employed could also be used to see if 
apologies in the U.K. Parliament are similar to apologies found in parliaments 
throughout the world.   
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